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Summary 
 
The Fault Tree methodology is appropriate when the component level failures (basic 
events) occur independently.  One situation where the conditions of independence are 
not met occurs when secondary failure events appear in the fault tree structure.  
Guidelines for fault tree construction, which have been utilised for many years, 
encourage the inclusion of secondary failures along with primary failures and 
command faults in the representation of the failure logic.  The resulting fault tree is an 
accurate representation of the logic but may produce inaccurate quantitative results 
for the probability and frequency of system failure if methodologies are used which 
reply on independence.   
 
This paper illustrates how inaccurate these quantitative results can be.  Alternative 
approaches are developed by which fault trees of this type of structure can be 
analysed. 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Fault Tree Analysis is now frequently used to assess the adequacy of systems from a 
reliability or availability viewpoint.  The technique was originally developed in the 
1960’s and guidelines were subsequently produced to describe how the engineering 
system can be modelled1.  Modelling the system results in a representation of the 
failure logic which can then be quantified2,3.  Model quantification produces: 
combinations of component level failures which will cause the system failure mode 
(minimal cut sets), system failure probability, system failure frequency and 
importance measures. 
 
It is critical that the fault tree construction process is performed accurately.  Following 
this there are many commercial software packages available to carry out the 
quantification.  Rules cannot be determined which govern the construction of the 
failure logic diagram and guarantee the production of the correct fault tree for all 
circumstances.  However, guidelines which provide a rigorous, systematic approach 
have been developed and are commonly applied by engineers.  One such guideline 
which can be found in reference 1 is that state-of-component faults can be developed 
in the fault tree structure by an OR-gate with primary failure, secondary failure and 
command faults as inputs. 
 
This paper shows that following this process, whilst producing correct failure logic,  
can lead to situations where the standard means of quantifying the top event 
probability will be incorrect.  The error occurs as the repair of individual component 
failures in a minimal cut set does not rectify the system state. 
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Two approaches are described which can be used to overcome this difficulty.  The 
first of these employs a Markov model to analyse the sections of the fault tree where 
the secondary failures are located.  The second method makes use of equations pre-
determined from Markov models of basic constructs which occur in sections of the 
fault tree containing secondary failures.  Both of these methods require that the 
section of the fault tree to which the method is applied is independent of the 
remainder of the fault tree.  In the first method this is the limiting factor governing the 
size of the fault tree section modelled using Markov.  
 
2.0 Fault Tree Construction for state-of-component faults 
 
A guideline proposed for the fault tree construction process1 was to classify events to 
be developed in the fault tree as either state-of component faults or state-of-system 
faults.  The distinction between the two was based on whether the event being 
developed could be caused by a single component failure or not.  Where the event 
cannot be caused by a single component failure it is classified as a state-of-system 
fault and developed by establishing the immediate, necessary and sufficient 
conditions and usually brings an AND gate into the fault tree.  If a single component 
failure can cause the event it is classed as a state-of-component fault and the fault tree 
is developed in terms of primary component failures, secondary component failures 
and command faults as shown in figure 1.  
 
In figure 1 a primary failure is defined as a component failure which occurs when the 
component is operating in its normal expected environment.  A secondary failure is 
one where the component is operating outside its intended operating environment 
(usually due to other failures occurring which cause an increased stress level on the 
component).  The command fault traces the fault back into other parts of the system 
which provide an input to the component and could cause a working component to 
exhibit the fault being developed.  For example, consider a control valve sub-system.  
To identify causes of the event that no fluid flows at the valve outlet, it is classified as 
a state-of-component fault and developed as shown in figure 1.  The primary 
component failure is the control valve itself failing closed.  A command fault is a 
failure of the valve control system which causes a functioning valve to close.   
Figure 1 Fault Tree for State-of-component fault 
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This approach has also been incorporated into texts which cover the fault tree method 
in detail2,3.  It is an effective way of generating a fault tree with the correct failure 
logic and is in itself non-controversial.  The potential problem comes in the later 
analysis stage where all basic events in the fault tree structure are assumed to occur 
independently.  The construction of the fault tree using this guideline introduces 
dependencies between the repair of the basic events.  A secondary failure causes the 
failure of another component in the system and so the rectification of the system 
functionality requires the repair of more components than those which combined to 
cause the original problem.  Failure to adequately account for this, by for example 
assuming independence between the basic events, can introduce large errors into the 
numerical procedures used to calculate the top event probability and frequency. 
 
 
Figure 2 Simple Pressure Tank System 
 
3.0 Pressure Tank Example 
 
As an example, consider the simple part of a pressure tank system illustrated in figure 
2.  The tank is filled by activating the pump.  The contents are used as required by 
opening and closing the outlet valve.  As a safety feature, in the event of overfilling 
the relief valve will open to keep the pressure within acceptable bounds.  It is required 
to predict the unavailability of the pressure tank due to its rupture.  This can be 
classified as a state-of-component fault since failure of the tank alone can produce this 
event.  The fault tree is then developed accordingly. 
 
The Top Event, “Rupture of the Pressure tank”, is developed as illustrated in figure 1 
and resolved into its primary and secondary causes (in this example the tank does not 
have a command fault).  The primary failure event is that the tank fails under normal 
expected conditions (TANK). The secondary failure event occurs when the tank fails 
whilst operating outside its normal expected operating conditions and is caused by an 
overpressure situation.  The overpressure which ruptures the tank (assuming 
overpressure will always have this outcome) is due to the pump control system failure 
which causes the pump to run for too long AND the safety feature (the pressure relief 
valve) fails to operate.  The event ‘fault in control system fails to stop pump’ is also a 
state-of-component fault and therefore developed in terms of its primary failure of E 
and secondary failure X.  The simple fault tree for this situation is represented in 
figure 3.  The minimal cut sets for this fault tree are: 
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Figure 3 Pressure Tank System Fault Tree 
 
The implication of the qualitative analysis is that the repair any of the events 
contained in a minimal cut set which causes the top event will result in the system 
failure mode no longer existing.  However when one of the events is a secondary 
failure this is no longer true. Consider minimal cut set 2. If these two events E and 
PRV occur together then in addition to these two components being in the failed state, 
the tank will also fail.  This is not an event in the minimal cut set.  Considering the 
minimal cut set alone, if the pump or pressure relief valve are repaired it would under 
conditions of independence rectify the top event.  However, since this failure is a 
secondary failure combination and results in tank rupture,  the tank must also be 
repaired to rectify the system. Since the tank repair time is likely to be considerably 
longer than the two elements of the minimal cut set, failure to account for this in the 
analysis will result in a serious underestimaton of the system unavailability. 
 
It should also be noted that the pressure relief valve failure, PRV, is an enabling 
event4. ie one which permits another event to cause the top event.  It is a failure of a 
safety device which, since it is normally inactive, will, on its own, have no effect on 
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the system unless the occurrence of an initiating event4 puts a demand on it to work. 
All other events in the fault tree are initiating events whose occurrence, unless 
mitigated, will cause the top event. 
 
Basic event failure and repair data are given in table 1. 
 
Basic Event 
Code 
Failure rate 
(per hour) 
Mean time to 
repair (hours) 
Inspection 
interval (hours 
Type of 
Failure 
Dormant 
(enabler) or 
Revealed 
(initiator) 
TANK 710.1 −x  500  R 
PRV 410.5 −x  25 1975 D 
E 310.2 −x  24  R 
X 310.2 −x  24  R 
Table 1 Component Failure and Repair Data 
 
A conventional analysis of the fault tree illustrated in figure 2 with basic event data 
given in table 1 gives: 
 
Top event probability  3.362 x 10-2 
Top event frequency  1.387 x 10-3 per hour 
 
A summary of the contribution to these results from each minimal cut set is given in 
table 2.  The full calculations are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Minimal Cut Set Probability 
q 
Frequency 
w 
TANK 4.99975 x 10-5 9.9995 x 10-8 
E . PRV 0.01693 7.0534 x 10-4 
X . PRV 0.01693 7.0534 x 10-4 
Table 2 Minimal Cut Set calculations to the top event 
 
These results have been obtained assuming independence of the basic events.  The 
correct modelling of a section of the fault tree which features secondary failures 
would need to be performed with a technique such as Markov methods2 which can 
take into account the repair time dependence. 
 
4.0 Markov Analysis  
 
Prior to performing a Markov Analysis of the system a number of assumptions are 
required as to how the system will be repaired.  These are as follows: 
i) If both X and E fail, PRV will be activated revealing E, if only E is repaired X 
will cause E to fail again hence both E and X are repaired. 
ii) If E or X fail causing PRV to activate it is assumed that there is no mechanism 
by which PRV can subsequently fail in an inactive (stuck) mode.  
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iii) If PRV fails first and subsequently E (or X ) fail then the tank will rupture and 
hence PRV , E (or X) and T will need to be repaired. 
iv) When the repair of more than one component is to be performed, it is assumed 
that they will be repaired sequentially and so the repair time for all 
components will be the sum of their individual repair times. 
 
The values used for these additional repair times are given in table 2. 
 
Repair of components Mean time to repair (hours) 
τ 
Repair rate (per hours) 
ν 
E+T 524 0.0019 
E+T+X 548 0.0018 
P+T 525 1.90476x10-3 
E+P+T 549 1.8215x10-3 
E+X 48 0.0208 
E+P+X 73 0.0137 
E+P 49 0.02041 
E+P+X+T  (all) 573 1.7452x10-3 
Table 2 Component combinations repair times 
 
The Markov model for the system, which provides a direct alternative means of 
analysis to the fault tree in figure 3 is shown in figure 4.  A list of the different states 
and the transitions between them is contained in Appendix B. 
 
In this figure λi and νi are the failure and repair rates for the basic events and so i=E, 
T, X and P.  Where more than one letter appears as the subscript for the repair rate it 
indicates a list of components whose repair is performed sequentially.  The Markov 
model has been constructed in two phases to model the periodic inspection process 
carried out on the pressure relief valve, PRV.  Phase 1 is a continuous phase which 
operates from t=0 to t=θ, the inspection interval for PRV.  During phase 1 a failure of 
this component on its own will remain unrevealed as indicated by the ‘U’ defining its 
condition in states 5 and 8.  The failure of the relief valve in phase 1 will only be 
revealed by a demand on it to function (failure of E or X).  Transitions between states 
in this phase are indicated by a solid line in figure 4.  Phase 2 is a discrete, 
instantaneous phase where the inspection takes place and reveals failures of the relief 
valve and transfers its status to ‘F’ (revealed failure awaiting repair) and enables the 
component to be repaired as indicated by states 11 and 14.  Instantaneous transitions 
occur every θ hours and are shown as a dotted line in figure 4.  Phases 1 and 2 occur 
cyclically until the mission time is reached. 
 
The resulting Markov model has 15 states.  Examination will indicate that a more 
concise model could have been developed as several states could have been merged 
into one.  For example states 10, 13 and 15 all feature the four components in the 
failed state. The model has deliberately been constructed in this way to take account 
of the order in which the failures occur and enable the contribution each minimal cut 
set makes to the system failure to be identified. Where the occurrence of failures 
cause the secondary failure of another component, this is indicated by ‘(F)’ in the 
state definitions.  F2 indicates that this was the second (initiating) failure event. 
 
For this model, states 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 15 are all failed states.  
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Figure 4  System Markov State Transition Diagram 
 
The state equations for phase 1 are given by: 
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For phase 2, at t=nθ the equations are: 
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These equations were solved for qi , i=1,,,15. The probability of system failure, the 
probability of the top event featured in the fault tree shown in figure 3, is given by: 
151413121098762 qqqqqqqqqqQ +++++++++=  
and the failure intensity by  
 9 
( ) ( )XET qqqqqqqw λλλ +++++++= )( 115115431 . 
 
Results for the failure probability and failure frequency using the Markov model are 
contained in table 3 and shown in figure 5 (averages taken over second and 
subsequent periods).  A comparison of the Markov results with those produced by the 
fault tree method are also shown in table 3.  The contributions from each of the three 
minimal cut sets are included. 
 
  Markov Results Fault Tree results 
Event States Average 
Q 
Max Q Average 
w (per 
hour) 
Max w 
(per 
hour) 
Q w 
System 
fails 
Any min 
cut sets 
0.1652 0.1794 2.95 x 
10-4 
3.27 x 
10-4 
0.03362  0.01387  
Min Cut 
Set 1 
2,6,7,8, 
12,13,14 
4.425 x 
10-5 
4.47 x 
10-5 
8.35 x 
10-8 
8.54 x 
10-8 
4.99975 
x 10-5 
9.9995 
x 10-8 
Min Cut 
Set 2 
9,15 0.081 0.0878 1.4725 
x 10-4 
1.63 x 
10-4 
0.01693 7.0534 
x 10-4 
Min Cut 
Set 3 
10 0.08425 0.0915 1.4725 
x 10-4 
1.63 x 
10-4 
0.01693 7.0534 
x 10-4 
Table 3 Comparison of Markov and Fault tree results 
 
It can be seen from the result in table 3 that there is a very large error in the fault tree 
results. 
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Figure 5 System failure probability and frequency from Markov model 
 
 
 
5.0 Quantification approaches for Secondary Failures 
 
It is clear from the example given above that there can be a significant error if fault 
trees which contain secondary failures are quantified by traditional techniques which 
assume independence.  The size of the error will vary depending on the fault tree 
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structure, the failure and repair data used, and the number of secondary failure events 
it contains.  Therefore no general conclusions can be made as to when the error 
experienced will become significant.  In the example given above the fault tree gave a 
optimistic value for the system failure probability and a pessimistic failure frequency.  
The Markov method can be used to produce an accurate assessment for any system 
featuring secondary failures.  However, the production of a Markov model for an 
entire system can require the solution of a large number of equations.  The size of the 
Markov diagram can explode exponentially with the number of basic events and is 
inefficient for moderate to large sized systems.  Therefore the generation of a large 
Markov model for the entire system does not provide an efficient solution to the 
problem.  Two alternative approaches have been investigated: 
i. Fault Tree Modularization Methods 
ii. Analysis of Basic Fault Tree Structures 
 
 
Each of these is described in the sections that follow. 
 
5.1 Fault Tree Modularization Methods  
 
In many cases it is only a small section of the system fault tree which features the 
secondary failures.  In these circumstances it is possible to analyse that section of the 
fault tree alone by the more computationally intensive Markov methods.  The section 
of the fault tree analysed in this way is then replaced by a super-event in the fault tree 
structure.  The failure probability and failure intensity of the super-event is derived 
from the Markov Analysis.  Analysing a section of the fault tree using the Markov 
approach and substituting the results back into the larger scale analysis has become a 
standard way of evaluating fault trees where dependencies such as those associated 
with standby and sequential systems are concerned5,6.     To perform this type of 
analysis in an efficient way requires that the section of the fault tree extracted for 
Markov analysis is itself independent of the remainder of the fault tree and has to be 
selected accordingly.   
 
5.2 Basic Fault Tree Structures 
 
A common feature of fault trees which contain secondary failures is that the 
secondary failure section of the fault tree is itself independent of the remainder of the 
fault tree.  In this situation it permits the use of analytical results obtained from the 
assessment of Markov models representing typical features of the fault tree.  This  
removes the need to perform the numerical analysis of a larger Markov model and 
makes the analysis faster to compute.  Consider the example fault tree shown in figure 
3, it has two basic fault tree constructs present (as do many of this type of fault tree).  
These are illustrated in figure 6.  The fault tree section to which the method is applied 
must therefore be restructured in terms of the constructs illustrated.  This is achieved 
by systematically defining complex events by pairs of basic events or other complex 
events occurring as inputs to the same gate type.  Failure and repair parameters to the 
complex events are then derived as follows: 
 
For complex events, CAND, which replace two input events X and Y into an AND 
gate, the failure probability, qCAND, and failure frequency, wCAND are given by: 
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For complex events, COR, which replace two input events X and Y into an OR gate, 
the failure probability, qCOR, and failure frequency, wCOR are given by: 
XYYXCOR
YXCOR
wqwqw
qqq
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Figure 6 Basic Fault Tree constructs 
 
Construct type 1 has two input events A and B where event A represents the primary 
failure of a component and event B the secondary failure.  This construct type appears 
twice in the fault tree shown in figure 3 at the highest gate (TOP) and the lowest gate 
(G2).  Construct type 2 appears where there is some protection (safety feature) which 
can mitigate the occurrence of a potential problem.  The event which causes the 
potential problem, the initiating event, is Event C in this construct.  Event D is an 
enabling event, failed safety system, which permits the initiating event to cause the 
problem.  Construct 2 is illustrated in gate G1 of the fault tree.  These two basic 
constructs have been analysed separately using Markov models to produce equations 
which can be used whenever they occur in a fault tree structure.  Steady-state 
conditions are assumed to prevail at the end of each inspection cycle as seems 
justified by looking at the graphs shown in figure 5.  
 
By determining probability, qC,  and failure intensity, wC, for a construct, these data 
can then be used in a super-event which replaces the construct in the fault tree.  By 
performing this type of substitution in a bottom-up manner for each gate in the fault 
tree a complete assessment can be accomplished for the secondary failure section. 
 
Construct 1. 
 
The Markov model to represent the primary and secondary failures is illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Markov Diagram of construct 1 
 
λA , λB are the failure rates for components A (primary failure) and B (secondary 
failure) respectively, νA , νAB are the repair rates for A and A and B together 
respectively. States 2 and 3 are failed states for this construct. The state equations for 
this module are: 
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The probability of the output event of this construct occurring is determined by: 
QC1= q2+ q3                                         (1) 
The failure intensity for construct 1, wC1, can be determined by: 
 
( )BAC qw λλ += 11      (2) 
 
Construct 2 
 
This construct allows for the provision of safety features in the secondary failure 
section of the fault tree.  The failure of the safety feature is represented by event D in 
figure 6.  If this has happened and then the initiating event C occurs it is unable to 
provide mitigation for event C and the failure propagates up the fault tree structure.  If 
the initiating event occurs prior to the enabling event the failure propagation will not 
result.  The Markov state transition diagram for this is illustrated in figure 8. 
 14 
 
C-W
D-W
1
C-F
D-W
2
C-W
D-F
3
C-F2
D-F1
4
λ λ
λ
ν
ν
νC
C
C
D
D
CD
 
Figure 8 Markov Diagram for construct 2 
 
 
νCD is the repair rate for events C and D together. In this case the only failed state is 
state 5.  The assumption is made that once both the initiating event and the enabling 
event have occurred repair will be instigated which will return both to the working 
state. 
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These equations were solved for qi , i=1 – 5 for the steady-state situation to give: 
α
ννλν CCDCDq )(1
+
=  
α
λλνν CCDCDq )(2
+
=  
α
ννλ CCDDq =3  
α
νλλ CDCq =4  
where: 
CCDCCCDCCDDCCDDCCDCCDD ννλνλλννλλννλννννα +++++= 2  
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The probability , QC2, of the super-event replacing Construct 2 is given by: 
QC2=q4                               (3) 
The failure intensity of Construct 2, wC2, is given by: 
wC2=λCq3      (4) 
 
5.3    Application to the simple pressure tank system 
 
The above constructs are applied progressively up through the pressure tank failure 
fault tree structure illustrated in figure 3.  The lowest gate in the structure is an OR 
gate with events E and X as inputs.  Event X is a secondary failure and hence this gate 
type satisfies the requirements of construct 1.  Using the failure and repair data for 
these components and equations (1) and (2) gives: 
QG2= 0.12767 
wG2= 3.4893 x 10-3. 
Using: 
Q
w
Q
w
=
−
=
ν
λ )1(
      (5) 
gives λG2=3.999x10-3,  νG2=2.733 x 10-2. 
 
The next gate to consider in the fault tree, gate G1, has as inputs gate G2 and the 
pressure relief valve failure (PRV).  The pressure relief valve is a safety feature and 
thus an enabling event.  Gate 2 is an initiating event which causes the over-
pressurisation and therefore puts a demand in the safety feature to respond.  This 
satisfies the requirements of construct 2 where G2 is the initiating event and PRV is 
the enabler.   Applying equations (3) and (4)  to gate G1 yields: 
QG1=0.019399 
wG1=3.14975 x 10-4 
[note  0162.0
2559.36
11
2
2 =+
=
+
=
PG
PG ττ
ν ] 
therefore λG1=3.212x10-4,  νG1=1.6237 x 10-2. 
 
Finally the top gate in the fault tree is considered.  Its structure is the same as gate G2 
and therefore the equations developed for construct 1 can be used again, with the 
parameters for the tank used for event A and those for gate G1 used for event B. This 
gives a prediction for the top event, system failure of: 
Qtop=0.15285 
wtop=2.7219 x 10-4. per hour 
 
This compares well with the average Markov values of Qtop=0.1652,  wtop=2.95 x 10-4 
per hour. 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
 
1. If secondary failures are to be modelled in a system failure probability 
assessment accurate results will not be obtained using the fault tree analysis 
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method.  This is despite suggestions in the literature that the development of 
the fault tree should be conducted in a way which considers this type of failure 
for each state-of-component fault which occurs. 
2. Markov methods will produce accurate results and can be applied to the 
smallest independent section of the fault tree which contains the secondary 
failure events.  Results of this are obtained numerically and substituted back 
into the system fault tree to replace the section of the fault tree analysed. 
3. If the part of the fault tree which contains the secondary failures contains 
events which are independent of the rest of the fault tree then constructs can be 
applied in a bottom-up manner to efficiently get an estimate of the top event 
failure parameters. 
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Appendix A – Fault tree quantification results 
 
The contributions (assuming basic event independence and that steady-state 
conditions prevail) are given by:  
For minimal cut set 1  {T} 
hourqw
q
cTc
TT
T
C
/109995.9)1(
1099975.4
8
11
5
1
−
−
×=−=
×=
+
=
λ
νλ
λ
 
For minimal cut set 2 {E, PRV} 
For the initiating event: 
hourqw
q
EEE
EE
E
E
/109084.1)1(
0458.0
3−×=−=
=
+
=
λ
νλ
λ
 
For the enabling event: 
( ) ( )
( )θλ
θλθλ
τλθλ
τλθλ
PRV
PRVPRV
e
eeq
PRVPRVPRV
PRVPRVPRV
PRV
−
−−
−+
−+−−
=
1
11
=0.3696 
This gives: 
hourqww PRVEC /100534.7 42 −×==  
01693.02 == PRVEC qqq  
 
For minimal cut set 3 {X, PRV} 
For the initiating event: 
hourqw
q
XXX
XX
X
X
/109084.1)1(
0458.0
3−×=−=
=
+
=
λ
νλ
λ
 
For the enabling event: 
( ) ( )
( )θλ
θλθλ
τλθλ
τλθλ
PRV
PRVPRV
e
eeq
PRVPRVPRV
PRVPRVPRV
PRV
−
−−
−+
−+−−
=
1
11
=0.3696 
This gives: 
hourqww PRVXC /100534.7 43 −×==  
01693.03 == PRVXC qqq  
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The system parameters are then obtained from: 
( ) hourqww
qQ
n
ij
j
cj
n
i
cisys
n
i
cisys
/103868.1)1(
03362.0)1(1
3
11
1
−
≠
==
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∏
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Markov model states 
State No. Component 
T 
Component 
E 
Component 
X 
Component 
PRV 
System 
1 W W W W W 
2 F W W W F (C1) 
3 W F W W W 
4 W (F) F W W 
5 W W W U W 
6 F
 
F W
 
W F (C1) 
7 F (F) F W F (C1) 
8 F W W U F (C1) 
9 (F) F2 W U F (C2) 
10 (F) (F) F2 U F (C3) 
11 W W W F W 
12 F F W U F (C1) 
13 F (F) F U F (C1) 
14 F W W F F (C1) 
15 (F)  F2 F F1 F (C2) 
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Transitions between states for full fault tree. 
State i State j  State i State j 
  
1 2 λT 7 1 νTEX 
1 3 λE 8 5 νT 
1 4 λX 8 12 λE 
1 5 λP 8 13 λX 
2 1 νT 9 1 νEPT 
2 6 λE 9 15 λX 
2 7 λX 10 1 νALL 
2 8 λP 11 1 νP 
3 1 νE 11 9 λE 
3 4 λX 11 10 λX 
3 6 λT 11 14 λT 
4 1 νEX 12 1 νTEP 
4 7 λT 12 13 λX 
5 8 λT 13 1 νALL 
5 9 λE 14 1 νTP 
5 10 νX 14 12 λE 
6 1 νTE 14 13 λX 
6 7 λX 15  1  νALL   
 
 
